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The maxims of the philosophers regardingthe conditions of the
possibility of a public peace shall be taken into considerationby
the States that are armedfor war. - Immanuel Kant'
INTRODUCTION

The dramatic increase in the activity of the Security Council in the
years since the end of the Cold War has placed that organ of the United
Nations in the spotlight of diplomatic and scholarly scrutiny.2 Perhaps it
is to be expected that the increased activity of the Security Council
should produce increased hopes and increased criticism. A reexamination of the role of the Security Council in international relations after its
fiftieth year of existence should include consideration of the philosophical foundations and assumptions underlying the Council to understand
whether it is built upon rock or shifting sands. In taking this theoretical
approach, I follow the advice of Immanuel Kant quoted above. Schemes
to reform or restructure the Security Council often fail to heed Kant's
advice by ignoring whether the underlying philosophical or normative
purposes of the Security Council make sense or can support redesigning
the Security Council for the next fifty years. I argue that the current and
future role of the Security Council is and will be limited by tensions in
liberal thought on international relations.
In Part I of this article, I provide a discussion about the use of
traditions of thought in international relations. Part II begins by briefly
examining the fundamental purpose of the Security Council - the
maintenance of international peace, and security. I then analyze the
philosophical origins of the idea of maintaining international peace and
security through an international organization to demonstrate how liberal
thought on international relations came to incorporate this idea. In this
analysis, I will demonstrate that liberal thought on the appropriateness of
relying on international organizations to maintain peace and security is
not unified and that three traditions within liberal thought compete for
prominence. In Part III, I will apply each of the three strands to the
question of what should be done with the Security Council as we ap-

1. IMMANUEL KANT, ETERNAL PEACE AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS 100 (W. Hastie
trans., World Peace Found. 1914) (1795).
2. One commentator notes that "[t]he volume of public discussion on the peace and
security functions of the UN in the post-Cold War period is currently overwhelming." Keith

R. Krause, The United Nations in the Post-Cold War World: Adaptation, Transformation,

Openness or Obsolescence?, 87 Pioc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 268, 277-78 (1993).
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proach the new millennium. I conclude that the Security Council's
potential in the future is limited by the lack of consensus in liberal
thought about its role in international relations.

I.

TRADITIONS OF THOUGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. The Tradition of Using Traditions
it is necessary at the outset to discuss the importance of traditions of
thought in the study of international relations. Various traditions or
schools of thought populate the discipline of international relations. 3 The
most famous traditions are realism, liberalism, and Marxism. 4 Stanley
Hoffmann defined realism as a "rigorous theory of international politics
that defines the states as the only. actors on the world scene, makes of
military power the decisive currency, and sees the hierarchy of military
5
might as the hierarchy in the international system.",
Anne-Marie Slaughter claims realism has been the "dominant approach in international relations theory for virtually the past two millennia, from Thucydides to Machiavelli to Morgenthau[.] ''6 Liberalism
refers to a body of thought the core of which is the liberty of the individual. Unlike realists, liberals view individuals as important actors in
international relations in both a positive and negative sense. Positively,
the actions of individuals through trade and commerce have a.significant
beneficial impact in international relations. Negatively, the state of war
and war itself in the international system threaten the liberty of the
individual at home in a liberal state. Liberalism posits, then, that international relations is not fundamentally about obtaining power as a shield
against anarchy but is about protecting individual liberty at home while
fostering individual liberty overseas.7 Marxism reflected the thought of

3. Timothy Dunne, Mythology or Methodology? Traditions in International Theory, 19

REV. INT'L STUD. 305, 305 (1993).
4. "Realism and Liberalism, along with Marxism, have been the three main philosophies
of international politics." Stanley Hoffmann & David P. Fidler, Introduction to JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, ROUSSEAU ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS at lxxvi (Stanley Hoffmann & David
P. Fidler eds., 1991).
5. STANLEY HOFFMANN, Hans Morgenthau: The Limits and Influence of "Realism", in
JANUS AND MINERVA: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

70, 73 (1987) [hereinafter

JANUS AND MINERVA].

6. -Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1, 5 (1995).
7. See STANLEY HOFFMANN, Liberalism and International Affairs, in JANUS AND
MINERVA, supra note 5, at 394; Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J.INT'L L. 205, 227 (1993); Slaughter,
supra note 6, at 5-7.
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Marx, Engels, and Lenin that international relations was little more than
another arena where the historical dialectic was working its way toward
socialism
The "big three" traditions identified above do not, however, represent all the traditions used in the study of international relations. E.H.
Carr identified a conflict between realism and utopianism.9 Martin
Wight developed a different set of traditions that he called
revolutionism, rationalism, and realism. I0 Yet another set of traditions
involves traditionalism and behavioralism." Michael Donelan posited the
existence of five traditions: natural law, realism, fideism, rationalism,
and historicism. 12 Another scholar notes the existence of an international
13
society tradition.
The vast array of traditions and traditions within traditions may
appear to some as chaotic and confused. 14 But the plethora of traditions
and schools suggests that the discipline of international relations uses
them as anchors or guideposts in making sense out of the turbulent
nature of international relations. These traditions ground analysis within
theoretical and philosophical ideas that provide not only descriptive
tools, but also normative positions in relation to the issues at stake. The
exploration, examination, and reexamination of these traditions of
thought constitute the common language of discourse about international
relations. In following Kant's advice, I am partaking in this discourse
and using it to examine the future of the Security Council. The resort to
international relations theory undertaken here connects with a broader
effort underway among international legal scholars to bring international
15
relations thinking to bear in examining international legal questions.

8. On Marxism, see VENDULKA KUBALKOVA & ALBERT A. CRUICKSHANK, MARXISM
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2d ed. 1989).
9. E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939, at 5-10, 22-88 (2d ed. 1946).

10. MARTIN WIGHT, INTERNATIONAL THEORY: THE THREE TRADITIONS 7-24 (Gabriele
Wight & Brian Porter eds., 1991).
11. See Hedley Bull, International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach, in
CONTENDING

APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 20 (Klaus Knorr & James N.

Rosenau eds., 1969) (advocating use of a "classical approach" to the theory of international
relations); Morton A. Kaplan, The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations, in CONTENDING APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra, at 39
(advocating the utility of analyzing the behavior of states scientifically).
12. See MICHAEL DONELAN, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY 7-97
(1990).

13. Dunne, supra note 3, at 316.
14. Dunne comments that "there is a danger that ... the coherence of the original
traditions have [sic] been displaced by a Babel of contending voices." Id. at 307.
15. See, e.g., the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter (formerly Anne-Marie Burley), namely
Anne-Marie Burley, Toward an Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393 (1992)
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B. Across Traditions or Within a Tradition?
The future role and structure of the Security Council can be analyzed by working across traditions of thought in international relations
theory or by examining the complexities of a single tradition. For example, it could be argued that the Security Council is a hybrid institution
reflecting both realism and liberalism. 16 The Security Council bears
realism's imprint in the veto power given to its five permanent members. 7 These permanent members form a "great power" club, which is
given special authority and privileges in the United Nations system
based on power considerations. The arguments for admitting Japan and
Germany as permanent members of the Security Council are often
phrased in terms of power: Japan and Germany deserve permanent seats
because of their economic power in the international system. 8
Yet, the Security Council also bears the imprint of liberalism, as it
forms the centerpiece of a collective security system designed to deter
aggression and increase peace and cooperation between states. The
concept of collective security was designed to move international relations away from balance of power politics toward a system of collective
responsibility and action against threats to peace and order. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that the creation of the United Nations
"spells - and it ought to spell - the end of the system of unilateral
action, exclusive alliances, and spheres of influence, and balances of
[hereinafter Toward an Age of Liberal Nations] (arguing that liberal internationalism will be
the framework for international politics in the next millennium); Anne-Marie Burley, Law
Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalismand the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1907 (1992) (analyzing the act of state doctrine through the application of a liberal
internationalist model of international relations); Slaughter Burley, supra note 7 (arguing for
an interdisciplinary approach to international law utilizing international relations theory,
especially liberal theory); Slaughter, supra note 6 (attempting to develop an integrated theory
of international law and international relations); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International
Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717
(1995) [hereinafter Liberal InternationalRelations Theory] (arguing that international relations
theory can contribute to international law and applying liberal international relations theory to
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law). Generally, on new approaches to the study of
international law, see David Kennedy.& Chris Tennat, New Approaches to InternationalLaw:
A Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 417 (1994).

16. Rochester writes that the United Nations "founders concocted an organization formed
by a mix of motives, blending at least one part idealism with several parts realism." J.
MARTIN ROCHESTER, WAITING FOR THE MILLENNIUM: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF WORLD ORDER 112 (1993).

17. U.N. CHARTER arts. 23, 27.

18. See Peter Wilenski, The Structure of the UN in the Post-Cold War Period,in UNITED
NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE UN's ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 437, 442

(Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS,
DIVIDED WORLD].
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power, and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries
and have always failed."'19 Collective security deemphasizes power as
traditionally understood in the international system and attempts to
create a mechanism where the exercise of power is grounded in the
legitimacy of collective action.20
Combining the power analysis that characterizes realism and the
collective security analysis of liberalism produces an institution that has
no philosophical or theoretical foundation. If the Security Council is about
management of the international system by great powers, then it is merely
an institutional manifestation of traditional balance of power politics and
great power prerogatives. The role of the great powers in the Security
Council undermines, however, the purpose of collective security, which
is to move international relations away from balance of power politics and
great power machinations. Yet, the great powers that are permanent
members cannot act expressly on power motivations because their status
as permanent members relates to the objective of collective security. Under
this analysis, the Security Council is caught between the dictates of
realism and the aspirations of liberalism. As a sort of half-way house for
realists and liberals, the Security Council is limited in its ability to act
because it has no clear philosophical direction or vision guiding its
activities.
Analyzing the Security Council as an uncomfortable compromike
between realism and liberalism is, however, a somewhat misleading
exercise because it fails to do justice to the tenets of realism. Properly
understood, realism has no tolerance for the institutionalization of balance
of power politics and great power prerogatives. If power is the defining
characteristic in international relations as posited by realism, then the great
powers will have a leading role, for better or worse, in international
affairs; and packaging this fact of life in the trappings of an international
organization changes nothing of the harsh reality of power politics. 21 To

19. Brian Urquhart, The Role of the United Nations in Maintaining and Improving
International Security, SURVIVAL, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 388.
20. On the concept of collective security generally, see INiS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS
INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (4th

ed. 1971); Karl Doehring, Collective Security, in I UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICE 110 (Rildiger Wolfrum ed., 1995). The relationship between the theory of collective

security and liberalism is traced later in this article. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
21. Slaughter Burley notes that
[a]lthough many of the fathers of the United Nations would have argued that it was
founded precisely on a Realist recognition of the necessities of power politics -

hence the special privileges for the great powers sitting on the Security Council Morgenthau specifically cites "the great attempts at organizing the world, such as the
League of Nations and the United Nations," as efforts to implement the wrongheaded
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the pure realist, the Security Council is a mistaken sideshow of little
practical importance.
A more sophisticated approach to analyzing the future of the Security Council is to work within the liberal tradition and to focus on the
different strands of thought that compose liberal thinking on international relations. Just as different traditions exist, distinct lines of thought are
discernible within the various traditions. The philosophical conundrum
present in the Security Council can thus be analyzed not as an awkward
compromise between realism and liberalism but as a reflection of competing perspectives within the liberal tradition. This line of inquiry
posits that (1) the collective security system at the heart of the Security
Council is a concept adopted by liberal thought on international relations, and (2) the tensions that limit the potential of the Security Council
arise, at least partly, from the lack of consensus in liberal thought on the
role of the Security Council. The focus on liberal thought is also appropriate because some have interpreted the collapse of communism and
the end of the Cold War as the triumph of liberalism as the philosophy
for the future.' Part of my argument challenges the "triumph of liberalism" thesis by demonstrating that liberal thought on international relations is not unified, but is, in fact, fractured along distinct fault lines. If
the Security Council is built on shaky philosophical ground, then its
future will always be marked by limitations created by the competing
liberal perspectives.

II.

THE IDEA AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

A. The FundamentalPurpose of the United Nations
The fundamental Charter-mandated purpose of the United Nations is
"[t]o maintain international peace and security[.] '23 The Security Council
is the most important organ of the United Nations because it has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security[.]" '24 The Security Council was to fulfill this responsibility
"conviction that the struggle for power can be eliminated from the international
scene."
Slaughter Burley, supra note 7, at 207-08 n.6.
22. See, most famously, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA,
MAN

THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST

(1992).

23. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 11. The preamble of the U.N. Charter states that.the peoples
of the United Nations are determined "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war[.]" Id. pmbl.
24. Id. art. 24.
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and thus the fundamental purpose of the United Nations - through a
system of collective security.
To locate the philosophical foundation of the Security Council, it is
necessary to analyze the origins of the idea that an international organization should be created and empowered to maintain international peace
and security. Such an analysis will demonstrate that the philosophical
foundation for the Security Council is liberalism.
B. The Formative Period of Liberal Thought
on InternationalRelations
The proposition that states should join together in a formal and
organized manner to cooperate on the prevention of war predates the
development of liberal thinking on international relations.26 In 1623,
Em6ric Cruc6 published "the first proposal for an international
organisation that was also a proposal for maintaining peace. 27 Other
early proposals for establishing some form of international organization
included the work of the French diplomat Sully (1638), William Penn
(1693), John Bellers (1710), and Saint-Pierre (1712).28 Each of these
early plans for international organization sought to end war between
European states by proposing a union or association of sovereign states
that would possess the power to use force to deal with states that
breached the peace.29
The idea of international organization was of sufficient popularity
and weight to cause Jean-Jacques Rousseau, perhaps the most
pessimistic of realists, 30 to explain and criticize the ideas of Saint-

25. Id. ch. VII. As Urquhart points out, "[ilt
is now seldom recalled that the original
Charter idea was that the collective security system of the United Nations would provide the
sense of security and mutual confidence which would allow disarmament and arms control to
proceed under the auspices of the Security Council." Urquhart, supra note 19, at 393.
26. Michael Howard located in pre-liberal peace theorists the seeds of what he calls the
liberal conscience regarding war. See MICHAEL HOWARD, WAR AND THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE 13-21 (1978).
27. F.H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 20 (2d ed. 1967). Crucd's
thinking about war and peace is also notable for his emphasis that free trade and economic
development were the long-term solutions to war. HOWARD, supra note 26, at 20. The
importance of free trade and economic interdependence in liberal thought will be traced at
various points later in this article.
28. Hinsley writes that "Crucd apart, these men were the authors of the first proposals of
modern times for establishing an international organisation whose primary object was the
maintenance of peace." HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 33.
29. Hinsley writes that "the dilemma involved in the need to base peace on the ultimate
sanction of force ... is inherent in the very notion of achieving peace by organisation
between separate states." Id. at 37.
30. Hoffmann & Fidler, supra note 4, at lxxvii.
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Pierre. 31 Rousseau's critique of Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual
Peace remains a classic realist analysis of the idea of using international
organization to prevent war and to provide security for independent
sovereign states. For Rousseau, the nature of the international system sovereign states interacting without a supreme authority - forces states
to provide for their own security. 32 The uncertainty present in the international system makes states seek power advantages over other states.
Each effort by a state to increase national security produces a response
from other states which feel threatened by the increase in power of that
state. The establishment of an international organization does not break
the cycle of the security dilemma because no state can relinquish its
sovereignty as it relates to national security in an international system.
Rousseau believed that the nature of the international system forces
princes to follow their "apparent" interests in power and to ignore their
"real" interests in a lasting peace.33 Rousseau admitted that the theory of
international organization - that states should relinquish sovereignty to
an organization looking out for the security and interests of the whole
had a humane logic to it. Rousseau noted that "[t]he advantages
which its realization would bring to each prince, to each nation, to the
whole of Europe, are immense, manifest, incontestable[.] '" 34 But, he
concluded that "to be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of
madness. '35 Rousseau believed that the only way to establish an international organization with the power to punish breaches of the peace was
"by a revolution," which Rousseau was not sure was "a thing more to
be desired or feared. ' 36 Rousseau's emphasis on the anarchy of the
international system, the importance of power, the competition dynamic,

31. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Abstract and Judgement of Saint-Pierre'sProject for

PerpetualPeace, in ROUSSEAU ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 4, at 53. Rousseau
was not alone in taking aim at Saint-Pierre and the idea of international organization. Hinsley
notes that Cardinal Fleury, Frederick the Great, and Voltaire all dismissed Saint-Pierre's
project as unrealistic or impracticable. See HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 45. But it was Rousseau who undertook "the first modern analysis of the international problem" in his work on
Saint-Pierre. Id.
32. The state on the other hand, being an artificial body, has no fixed measure; its
proper size is undefined; it can always grow bigger; it feels weak so long as there
are others stronger than itself. Its safety and preservation demand that it makes
itself stronger than its neighbours....
...[I]t is forced to compare itself in order to know itself ....
The State of War, in
supra note 4, at 33, 37-38.
33. ROUSSEAU, supra note 31, at 89-90.
34. Id. at 88.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 100.
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,

ROUSSEAU ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
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and the prevalence of war expresses realism's tenets; his rejection of
international organization retains its realist edge even today.
The initial development of liberal thinking on international relations
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not include a role for
international organization. The early liberal thinkers, such as John Locke
and David Hume,37 posited that the law of nature, trade, and the balance
of power would be the guarantors of order and peace in the international
system.38 Liberal thought as represented by Locke and Hume did not
include the transformation and improvement of international relations.39
In fact, early liberal thought could be distinguished from the work of the
early peace theorists by its rejection of the idea of international organization.
The emphasis on the balance of power as a force for moderation in
the thinking of Locke and Hume did not go unchallenged in liberal
thinking as it developed in the eighteenth century. The philosophes attacked the balance of power as irrational and arbitrary. 4° Rather than
promote the idea of some form of world government or international
organization as an alternative to the balance of power, the philosophes
promoted the idea that economic interdependence, a concept also found
in Locke and Hume, would bind states together in a community of
interests that would make war unthinkable. 4 1 Even at this early stage in
its development, liberal thought contained tensions about the proper path
to international peace and security in the division over the balance of
power.42
The idea of international organization makes its appearance in
liberal thought through the thinking of Immanuel Kant and Jeremy
Bentham. Kant wrote that "the state of peace cannot be founded ...

37. HOFFMANN, supra note 7, at 402.
38. See David P.Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought: The Use of Force in the Reagan

Years, 11Auz.J.INT'L & Comp.L.45, 53-54 (1994). Hume wrote a classic essay inwhich
he praised the balance of power. See DAVID HUME, Of the Balance of Power, inESSAYS:
MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 339 (Grant Richards ed., 1903) (1741).
39. Fidler, supra note 38, at 53.

40. Felix Gilbert, The "New Diplomacy" of the Eighteenth Century, 4 WORLD POL. 1, 8,
10-11 (1951).

41. Fidler, supra note 38, at 57-58.
42. As used in this essay, the "balance of power" has the general meaning given to it by
Vattel: "[A] state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant
and can lay down the law to others." HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 101 (1977).
Generally, on the balance of power in international relations, see id. at 101-26; EDWARD V.
GULICK, EUROPE'S CLASSICAL BALANCE OF POWER (1967); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS

AMONG NATIONS 173-228 (5th ed. rev. 1978); WIGHT, supra note 10, at 164-79.

Winter 1996]

Security Council in Philosophical Conundrum

without a compact of the nations with each other., 43 This compact
between independent states would have as its goal the renunciation of
the right to wage war, for Kant argued that "[t]he notion of a right to go
to war cannot be properly conceived as an element in the law of nations." 44 Kant thus rejects the balance of power as a source of order in
international relations. Kant's compact sounds very much like the international organizations proposed in the seventeenth and early-eighteenth
centuries by Cruc6, Sully, Penn, Bellers, and Saint-Pierre in the emphasis on giving up the right to wage war as a condition for joining the
international organization.
Kant's international organization is, however, radically different
from those earlier proposals. First, Kant invested the international compact with no powers to maintain international peace and security in the
event one state resorted to force against another state.45 Second, the pur'pose of the international compact was to base cooperation between
independent states upon "an improved law of nations." 46 The removal of
the right to wage war from the law of nations was one aspect of this
new international law, but Kant also stressed the importance of what he
called the "Cosmopolitan" or "World law." This Cosmopolitan Law was
limited to providing the right of universal hospitality, which was a right
to trade and travel without discrimination.47 Cosmopolitan Law formed
part of Kant's belief in the peaceful effects of trade and commerce, a
belief Kant shared with Locke, Hume, and the philosophes. Third, Kant
stressed the importance of the constitution of the states joining the
international compact to the prospects for a lasting peace. Kant's First
Definitive Article in his plan for perpetual peace was that "[t]he civil
constitution in every State shall be republican. 48 One of the key pillars
of peace in Kant's theory is the transformation of states themselves
toward democratic government. Ideological like-mindedness would
provide a foundation of trust for the international compact.49 This trust
would allow states to engage in the reduction and elimination of stand-

43. KANT, supra note 1, at 84.
44. Id. at 85.
45. HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 66.
46. Id. at 68.
47. Id. at 65.
48. KANT, supra note 1, at 76.
49. Hinsley writes that Kant "regarded the internal improvement of states not as a
guarantee of international peace but at most as a condition of it and perhaps as a consequence
of it." HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 76.
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ing armies, or disarmament.' Fourth, Kant envisioned the international
compact as a global, rather than just as a European, institution. 5'
While Kant's vision for his international organization was profound,
the envisioned international organization was very limited and without
formal institutions or enforcement powers. Kant's compact is not about
maintaining international peace and security but is concerned with
establishing a peaceful dynamic in which democratic states could obtain
peace through disarmament and trade. The real forces at work in Kant's
thinking are ideological like-mindedness and economic interdependence.52
Bentham's plan for international peace included a different role for
international organization. Bentham echoed the lack of interest in international organizations demonstrated by early liberal writers and eighteenth century philosophers. 53 For example, two key planks of his project for universal peace were decolonization and disarmament 54 projects Bentham believed could be undertaken without the help of an
international organization.55 Hinsley writes that Bentham, in opposing
the balance of power and favoring peace through free trade, "was wholly representative of the prevailing attitude to international relations in
the second half of the eighteenth century. 56 But, as with Kant, Bentham
incorporated a very limited notion of international organization into his
thinking. Bentham favored the creation of an international tribunal for
resolving international disputes.5 ' Bentham added, however, an enforcement mechanism to support the decisions of the international tribunal world public opinion.58 It is in this last piece of the plan that Bentham
connects most directly with Kant. Bentham realized that for public
opinion to be an enforcement mechanism, "liberty of the press in each

50. KANT, supra note 1, at 71.
51. Kant wrote that "the idea of a cosmopolitan right of the whole human race is no
fantastic or overstrained mode of representing right, but is a necessary completion of the
unwritten code which carries national and international law to a consummation in the public

law of mankind." Id. at 89.
52. On Kant's international relations thinking, see generally CARL J. FRIEDRICH, INEVITABLE PEACE (1948); Andrew Hurrell, Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in InternationalRelations, 16 REV. INT'L STUD. 183 (1990); Kenneth J. Waltz, Kant, Liberalism, and War, 56
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 331 (1962).

53. HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 81.
54. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRs 186-88 (Arnold Wolfers &
Laurence Martin eds., 1956) [hereinafter ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION].
55. HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 83-85.

56. Id. at 82.
57. ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION, supra note 54, at 189.

58. Id.
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state" would have to be guaranteed. 59 What Bentham indirectly advocated was a form of domestic government that was democratic in that
the people could remove the leaders for failing to heed public opinion. 6
Bentham's disciple, James Mill, made this democratic assumption even
more explicit. 6' Thus, like Kant, a key to Bentham's limited international organization is the democratic development of the states in the international system.
In its formative phase, liberal thought on international relations
already exhibited different emphases on important aspects of international politics, most particularly the balance of power. A consensus seemed
to form on the importance of economic interdependence in constraining
the behavior of states. Both Kant's and Bentham's theories agree on the
necessity for democracies and disarmament in the international system.
Through their thinking, the idea of international organization was incorporated into liberal thought in a very limited way. However, neither
Kant nor Bentham empowered their limited international organizations
to maintain actively international peace and security. Clearly, the foundation for the Security Council was not laid in the formative period of
liberal thought on international relations.
C. From the Formative Period to the League of Nations
In the decades after the formative period of liberal thought, on
international relations until the First World War, the idea that international organization was necessary to maintain international peace and
security did not advance significantly in liberal thought. Bentham's
proposal for an international court to adjudicate disputes, the decisions
of which would be enforced by world public opinion, was the dominant
theme in ideas for international organization presented in the United
States and Great Britain during the nineteenth century. 62 Hinsley notes
that some continental writers differed substantially from Anglo-Saxon
international activists in proposing European federation as a solution to
the problem of war.63 These nineteenth century reprises of the federative
plans from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries did not, how-

59. Id.
60. Howard notes that "[u]nderlying the ideas of Bentham and all his disciples was the
assumption that all peoples, all nations, all cultures, were homogenous, or could be made
so.... Bentham in fact wanted to turn everyone into Englishmen." HOWARD, supra note 26,
at 34-35. This "form of cultural imperialism," id. at 34, is part of the reason why Howard
attacks Bentham's work as "smug, parochial and simplistic," id. at 33.
61. HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 89.
62. Id. at 92, 116.
63. Id. at 103.
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ever, sink deep roots in the peace movements of the nineteenth century.' The dominant themes of nineteenth century peace thinking were
similar to the ideas which developed in the formative period of liberal
thought: democracy, disarmament, economic interdependence, and
international tribunals for the peaceful settlement of disputes backed up
by enlightened public opinion. 65
The realities of nineteenth century international politics rendered
heavy blows to the prevailing direction of liberal thought. The growing
power of the state, the lack of democratic development in the international system, the failure of disarmament proposals, the rise of nationalism, and the outbreak of wars (especially the Crimean War (1854-56)
and the wars of German unification (1864, 1866, and 1870-71)) led
some thinkers to posit the need for an international organization to
enforce, by military power, international law and the decisions of international tribunals.' Although this initial movement toward the conception of an international organization empowered to maintain international peace and security was overshadowed by "plans for codifying international law and on elaborating an arbitration procedure working without
sanctions[,]" 67 this conception returned to the forefront of discussion at
the end of the century as relations between the great European powers
deteriorated. 6' Prior to the First World War, no substantial progress was
made toward the foundation of an international organization empowered
to maintain international peace and security. Nonetheless, the notion that
the limited international organizations envisioned by Kant and Bentham
would be insufficient to maintain peace had found its way, albeit precariously, into liberal thought on international relations.
D. The Arrival of Collective Security: The League of Nations
and the United Nations
The cataclysm of the First World War provided the opportunity for
the theory of collective security to find a prominent place in liberal
thought on international relations in the form of the League of Nations.
The reappearance of a collective security system in the United Nations
after the Second World War confirmed the theory of collective security
as a key component of liberal international thought. In the League of
Nations and the United Nations, liberal states played the leading roles in

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 116-17.
See generally id. at 92-149.
Id. at 135-37.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 139.
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creating international organizations charged with maintaining international peace and security. The leading liberal figure in the initial creation of a collective security system was Woodrow Wilson, who has
been referred to as "the father of the modern concept of collective
security[.] '69 In essence, liberal thought adopted an idea it had previously rejected: the establishment of an international organization empowered to keep the peace among states. What is not appreciated today is
that the adoption of the theory of collective security was a radical
development in the history of liberal thought on international relations.
The movement to a collective security mechanism within an international organization represented an attempt to restrict state sovereignty institutionally, in contrast to the more organic restraints and limits previously envisioned by liberal thinkers, like the development of democracy
and economic interdependence.
In one respect, the adoption of a collective security system in the
League of Nations and the United Nations conformed to one. aspect of
liberal thought: the rejection of the balance of power.7' In all other respects, however, a collective security approach represents an innovation
in liberal thought because it seeks to restrain sovereignty formally and
substantially through an international organization. A collective security
system has two basic elements. First, the unilateral resort to war by a
state is restricted in international law. The Covenant of the League of
Nations restricted the sovereign right to resort to force. 7' So too, does
the Charter of the United Nations.72 Second, a mechanism to provide for
the collective use of force by the international community against a state
threatening international peace and security is created. Both the League

69. M.V.

NAIDU, COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

4 (1974).

70. BULL, supra note 42, at 239 (asserting that the principle of collective security rejects

the balance of power).
71. The Covenant contained three restrictions on the right to wage war: states could not
(1) resort to war within the three months that followed an arbitral or judicial decision, (2)
enter war with a state that had conformed to an arbitral or judicial decision, and (3) enter war
with a state that had conformed to the unanimous recommendations of the Council of the
League of Nations. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 12, para. 6, art. 13, para. 4, art. 15,
para. 6. For an analysis of the Covenant's provisions restricting the use of force, see IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 55-65 (1963).
72. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. For an analysis of Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, see Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37 (2d ed. 1991).
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of Nations 73 and the United Nations 74 established a collective security
mechanism.
The introduction of collective security concepts into liberal thought
on international relations brought with it darker assumptions about the
nature of international relations that accompanied the creation of the
League of Nations and the United Nations. Prior to the inception of
these organizations, liberals were animated by a faith and confidence in
human reason and progress.75 Stanley Hoffmann observed that "[t]he
champions of progress predicted a sort of rollback of war by reason and
a victory of commerce over conquest. They foresaw a world in which
state power would have been shrunk and rendered largely harmless by
the growth of the sphere of individual transactions across borders. 76 A
key element to this liberal faith in reason and progress was a belief in
the "harmony of interests," which Carr described as "the doctrine of the
identity of interests [which] has commonly taken the form of an assumption that every nation has an identical interest in peace, and that
any nation which desires to disturb the peace is therefore both irrational
and immoral. 77
A notable exception to proponents of this liberal faith in reason was
Kant, who had a very dark view of human nature and the potential of
reason. In tact, Kant attempted to show that man's irrationality would
slowly diminish over the course of history through war. 78 The coming of
age of the collective security system suggested that liberals were losing
their faith in the rationality of states and peoples - a belief that had
provided the foundation for much of liberal thought. The power and violence of an aggressor could not be prevented or punished by world
public opinion or economic interdependence but only by the countervailing power possessed and wielded by an international organization on

73. Article 16(l) of the Covenant provided that: "Should any Member of the League
resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be
deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League." LEAGUE
OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 16, para. 1. Since each League member promised to protect the
territorial integrity and political independence of all other League members against external
aggression, see id. art. 10, Article 16 of the Covenant committed League members to impose
economic sanctions against the aggressor and authorized the League to make recommendations for military action by the League against the aggressor, id. art. 16.
74. In the case of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression[,]"
the Security Council is empowered to call for economic and diplomatic sanctions, or to take
military action to maintain or restore international peace and security, with military forces
made available by member states. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-43.
75. See CARR, supra note 9, at 22-31; see also HOWARD, supra note 26, at 32.

76.

HOFFMANN,

supra note 7, at 402.

77. CARR, supra note 9, at 51.

78.

HINSLEY,

supra note 27, at 72-75.
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behalf of the international community. Although the collective security
system rejects balance of power politics as practiced by individual states
and alliances of states, collective security endeavors to establish a deterrent to any single state based on a preponderance of power of all the
rest of the states.79 In incorporating the idea of collective security, liberal
thought brought back the relevance of power as a factor in international
relations, a relevance last emphasized by Locke's and Hume's support
for a balance of power. The re-acknowledgment of power present in the
collective security idea contained echoes of liberalism's theoretical
nemesis: realism.
The collective security system, as manifested in the Security Council
with its "great power" club, constituted an even more dramatic acceptance of the importance of power in maintaining international peace and
security. This express acknowledgment of one of the fundamental tenets
of realism had two sources: (1) the framers of the United Nations believed that one of the reasons the League of Nations failed as a collective security system was that it "lacked teeth" - and giving the great
powers primary roles would make their respective "teeth" a real factor
in collective security, and (2) none of the great powers would endorse
the collective security system without a veto power over the actions of
the Security Council. 80 Through collective security, liberal thinking attempted to effect an "institutionalization of power"'" rather than leave
power politics in a decentralized, anarchic environment. Collective
security represented a radical theoretical development in liberal thought
because it was based on two elements - power and international organization - that traditionally had been rejected or minimized in liberal
thinking.
Although the adoption of collective security marked a radical change
in liberal thinking on international relations, the collective security
system established in the United Nations still retained some of the old
liberal belief in the "harmony of interests." For collective security to
work through the Security Council, the great powers would have to
share identical interests in preserving the peace and pursue such shared
interests cooperatively. If it was no longer plausible for liberals to
believe that the "harmony of interests" extended throughout the international system, then liberals reduced the scope of this doctrine and ap-

79. BULL, supra note 42, at 239.
80. HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 340; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council's First
Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 507 (1995).
81. Malbone W. Graham, Great Powers and Small States, in PEACE, SECURITY & THE
UNITED NATIONS 57, 71 (Hans J. Morgenthau ed., 1946).
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plied it to the great powers with permanent seats on the Security Council. 82 The recognition of the power element in international relations that
is apparent in the liberal adoption of the collective security idea cuts
into the "harmony of interests" doctrine; but the rationalism of earlier
liberal thought survives in the assumption that the permanent members
of the Security Council share a commitment to the preservation of
peace.
E. The Renaissance of the Balance of Power in Liberal Thought
International politics following the Second World War quickly
rendered the Security Council's collective security system moribund.
The superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union
froze the collective security mechanism since the veto power of either
state killed any possibility that the Security Council could play any role
in maintaining international peace and security. The almost immediate
collapse of the Security Council's fundamental responsibility had a
profound effect on liberal thinking because it marked the ascendancy of
a new liberal perspective that returned the balance of power to the
forefront of dealing with international peace and security. Led by the
United States, the liberal states in the international system pursued a
policy of containment of Soviet power and ignored the Security Council
as an institution with any potential to preserve international order.
The reemergence of the balance of power as a central feature of
liberal international thinking represented something old as well as something new in liberal thought. The emphasis on the balance of power in
the period from 1948 to 1989 in liberal thinking and diplomacy recalled
the ideas of Locke and Hume, both of whom considered the balance of
power to be one of the moderating influences in international politics.
For Locke and Hume, however, the balance of power was one of three
main moderating forces (the other two being the law of nature and
trade); but for liberal thinking in the Cold War era, the balance of power
became the most important aspect of foreign policy. The ascendancy of
the balance of power in liberal thinking also represented something new
82. As Kirgis points out, the Security Council permanent members' veto power replaced
the provision in the League of Nations Covenant that required unanimity in the League
Council and Assembly. Kirgis, supra note 80, at 506-07. Kirgis notes the "harmony of
interests" thinking behind the creation of the Security Council:
The assumption was that, as in the days of the League, many international disputes
would be of little or no interest to the major powers. They would wish to see such
disputes resolved amicably, and would have no real incentive to veto dispute
settlement measures that were acceptable to a Council majority.
Id. at 507-08 (footnote omitted).
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in that it marked the first time that liberal thought explicitly relied on
key tenets of realism. The attempt to institutionalize power in a collective security system indicated that liberalism was edging closer to realism, but the failure of the collective security system allowed realist
beliefs to exert even stronger influence in liberal thinking.
The incorporation of realist attitudes by liberals did not mean that
realism had swallowed up liberalism. Liberals who could not deny the
power of realist analysis in analyzing international politics likewise
could not submit entirely to the bleak future realism offered. The curious blend of liberalism and realism present in liberal thinkers of the
post-Second World War period has been noted by commentators."
Stanley Hoffmann portrayed this mixture of liberalism and realism
within liberals as "a kind of permanent dialogue between Rousseau and
Kant," meaning that the "statesman's difficulty is that he must play the
game of international competition, from which he can escape only
exceptionally, and at the same time he ought not to lose sight of Kant's
ideal. ' 4 This dialogue in liberal thinking during the Cold War period
resulted in the maintenance of the balance of power to provide an order
in international relations in which democracies could be secure and
perhaps prosper. At the same time, the realism of the balance of power
intertwined with the traditional liberal concerns for economic interdependence and democracy as liberal states attempted to promote freer
trade and economic interdependence through the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, regional cooperation, and bilateral partnerships.85

III.

THE TRADITIONS WITHIN THE LIBERAL TRADITION AND
THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The brief overview of the idea of international organization in
liberal thought on international relations indicates that the liberal tradition actually contains three different perspectives on the wisdom of
attempting to maintain international peace and security through an
international organization. I call these perspectives liberal internationalism, liberal realism, and liberal globalism. In this Part, I will outline the

83. See HOFFMANN, supra note 7, at 394; JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS,
AND POLITCAL TRIALS 125 (2d ed. 1986). The impossibility that liberals could fully embrace
realism was also noted by inter-war commentators. See CARR, supra note 9, at 89-94;
REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY,
84. Hoffman & Fidler, supra note 4, at Ixx-lxxi.

231-32 (1932).

85. Robert Gilpin writes that, after the Second World War, "[lI]ed by the American
hegemon, the major trading nations moved in the direction of the precepts of liberal trade
theory." ROBERT ,GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 190

(1987).
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perspectives of each of these traditions in relation to the idea of using
an international organization to maintain international peace and security
and discuss the position of each tradition concerning the future of the

Security Council.
A. Liberal Internationalism
The term "liberal internationalism" refers to the tradition of liberal
thought that views international organization as vital to the maintenance
of international peace and security. 6 This is a belief in the need to
empower an international organization with authority to maintain or to
be involved in maintaining international peace and security. This idea
developed in the first half of the twentieth century and was not part of

prior liberal thought on international relations. Liberal internationalism
differs from traditional liberal theory in its emphasis on international
organization and its recognition of the role of power in international
relations.
Despite the spectacular failures of the collective security systems in
the League of Nations and the United Nations, liberal internationalism
was not consigned to the ash heap of history. During the Cold War, the
Security Council developed peacekeeping as a way of giving itself a
role in maintaining international peace and security. Although peacekeeping does not directly involve collective security, 7 the peacekeeping
function is compatible with the objective of maintaining international

86. My use of the term "liberal internationalism" overlaps with Anne-Marie Slaughter's
definition of "liberal internationalism," which she defines as the "belief 'in the necessity of
leadership by liberal democracies in the construction of a peaceful world order through
multilateral cooperation and effective international organizations."' Toward an Age of Liberal
Nations, supra note 15, at 394 (quoting Richard N. Gardner, The Comeback of Liberal
Internationalism,WASH. Q., Summer 1990, at 23). My use of liberal internationalism differs
from Slaughter's in that she does not identify collective security and the Security Council as
belonging to liberal theory on international relations. Slaughter identifies realism, liberalism,
and institutionalism as the "three principal schools of international relations theory[.]" Liberal
InternationalRelations Theory, supra note 15, at 718. Slaughter defines institutionalism as a
theoretical perspective reflecting "the belief that 'rules, norms, principles and decision-making
procedures' can mitigate the effects of anarchy and allow states to cooperate in the pursuit of
common ends[.]" Id. at 724-25. She classifies the U.N. Charter and its collective security
system as belonging to institutionalism rather than liberalism. Id. at 726-27. As shown in Part
II, however, the very ideas of international organization and collective security form key parts
of the liberal tradition of thinking about international relations. Slaughter's own definition of
liberal internationalism includes "effective international organization." I see "institutionalism"
as part of the liberal tradition rather than an entirely different theory. Slaughter acknowledges
that her use of institutionalism differs from other international relations scholars, like Robert
Keohane, who place institutionalism within the liberal tradition. Id. at 724 n.25.
87. A. LEROY BENNETT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 140 (5th ed. 1991).
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peace and security."8 Indeed, it has helped to contain local conflicts from
escalating into regional or international conflicts.89
The end of the Cold War and the reinvigoration of the Security
Council has brought liberal internationalism back into the limelight. The
successful authorization by the Security Council of the use of force by
member states during the 1990-91 Gulf War raised hopes that the Security Council would again be considered vital to maintaining international
peace and security.' Proponents of liberal internationalism also note that
today's main threats to international peace and security come not from
interstate relations but from the disintegration of states and civil societies. 9' The Security Council has adapted to this reality by engaging in
what has been described as peacemaking and humanitarian intervention
in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. The importance
and relevance of the Security Council to questions of present day international peace and security finds support in the frequency with which
the Security Council has been called on since the end of the Cold War
to deal with conflicts. As Rochester has argued, "there is little to support the argument that the UN is marginal to most modern day conflict." 92
Liberal internationalism illustrates not only the relevance of the
Security Council in relation to questions of peace and security but also
the increasing role of the Security Council in the democratization of the
international system. The Security Council's backing of the use of military force to restore Haitian democracy illustrates the Security Council's

88. Sally Morphet, UN Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring, in UNITED NATIONS,
DIVIDED WORLD, supra note 18, at 183.
89. Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: The UN's Roles in International
Society Since 1945, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD, supra note 18, at 1, 33; cf.
Michael Howard, The HistoricalDevelopment of the UN's Role in InternationalSecurity, in
UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD, supra note 18, at 63, 77-78. Morphet observed that since

1945, the United Nations had created twenty-nine peacekeeping operations, sixteen of them
since 1987. Morphet, supra note 88, at 183.
90. For analyses of the performance of the Security Council in response to Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, see Derek Gilman, The Gulf War and the United Nations Charter:Did the Security
Council Fulfill Its Original Mission? 24 CONN. L. REV.- 1131 (1992); Stephen M. De Luca,
Comment, The Gulf Crisis and Collective Security Under the United Nations Charter, 3 PACE
Y.B. INT'L L. 267 (1991); Christopher John Sabec, Note, The Security Council Comes of Age:
An Analysis of the InternationalLegal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 21 GA. J.INT'L
& COMP. L. 63 (1991).

91. Cf. Leslie H. Gelb, Quelling the Teacup Wars: The New World's Constant Challenge, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 2, 5.
92. ROCHESTER, supra note 16, at 124. In response to the recent vigor of the Security
Council, Kirgis notes that issues surrounding the Security Council's performance since the
end of the Cold War "have had much more to do with the possible abuse of power than with
the abdication of it." Kirgis, supra note 80, at 537.
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potential to include democracy as an element of maintaining international peace and security. 93 This development parallels the fact that the
United Nations is increasingly an agent of democratization in the international system.94
Questions about the future of the Security Council take on great
meaning for liberal internationalism because the Security Council remains the central organ of the United Nations with a mandate to maintain international peace and security. As one commentator stated: "The
need for an effective United Nations is real. 95 The key questions under
the liberal internationalist perspective concern what the Security Council
should do in the future and with what structure. Structural reforms
receive the most attention, mainly in the form of adding certain states as
new permanent members of the Security Council.' Discussion about the
substantive role the Security Council should play in maintaining international peace and security includes proposals to make the collective security system work properly, to improve peacekeeping, and to strengthen
the commitment to peacemaking and humanitarian intervention.97

93. For analyses of the Security Council's actions with respect to Haiti, see Richard Falk,
The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 341 (1995); see also Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community After
Haiti: Rethinking the Collective Use of Force, 89 AM. J.INT'L L. 70 (1995).
94. ROCHESTER, supra note 16, at 128. In this respect, the Security Council's actions
support what some observe is a developing right of democratic governance in international
law. Compare Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (1992) (arguing that a right to democratic governance has emerged under international law) with Thomas Carothers, Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in InternationalLaw, 86 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 261 (1992) (arguing that the norm
of democracy in international law is based on superficial empirical evidence).
95. Roger A. Coate, The Future of the United Nations, in U.S. POLICY AND THE FUTURE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3, 3 (Roger A. Coate ed., 1994).
96. Ronald I. Spiers, Reforming the UnitedNations, in U.S. POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 95, at 19, 27-28. For an analysis of the debate on expand-

ing the number of permanent members, see Michelle Smith, Expanding Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council: Opening a Pandora'sBox or Needed Changes?, 12 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 173 (1993).

97. An extensive plan for Security Council reform is contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations released in June 1992. In An Agenda for Peace, the
Secretary-General sets out five goals for the Security Council's future: (I) to improve the
Security Council's capabilities in preventive diplomacy, (2) to engage in peacemaking when
conflicts erupt, including the use of military force, (3) to preserve peace through peacekeeping, (4) to engage in peace-building in post-conflict settings, and (5) to address the underlying
causes of conflict. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992) [hereinafter An Agenda for Peace]. On Security
Council reform, see Maurice Bertrand, The HistoricalDevelopment of Efforts to Reform the
UN, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD, supra note 18, at 420, 431, 435-36; Barry M.
Blechman, The Military Dimensions of Collective Security, in U.S. POLICY AND THE FUTURE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 95, at 67; Krause, supra note 2, at 277-84; Wilenski,

supra note 18, at 437, 441-45.
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Discussions about potential structural and substantive reforms of the
Security Council illuminate some fundamental tensions in liberal internationalism. Because liberal internationalism recognizes the role of
power through the collective security system and the permanent membership of the Security Council, arguments that the Security Council
does not currently reflect the power structure or the changing nature of
power in the international system must be taken seriously. The attempt
to institutionalize power becomes, however, more difficult as more great
powers are recognized as permanent members.98 Adding new permanent
members, even if they are liberal democracies, might dilute the potential
effectiveness of the Security Council. 99 A diminished structural effectiveness would derail substantive reforms designed to make the Security
Council more effective, for example, in peacekeeping operations. The
difficulties that expanding the permanent membership of the Security
Council would create perhaps explains why An Agenda for Peace - the
United Nations Secretary-General's blueprint for the Security Council's
future - never addresses the addition of new permanent members. If
expanded permanent membership makes it more difficult for the Security Council to function, then effective resolution of the proper role of the
Security Council in maintaining international peace and security is
placed in jeopardy. Liberal internationalism confronts the unpleasant
task, which is ordained by its own tenets, of (1) taking seriously reforms
that could erode the effectiveness of the Security Council, or (2) working to improve performance through an institutionalization of power that
is anachronistic.
Substantive reform ideas also create problems for liberal internationalism. The suggestions contained in An Agenda for Peace1° to make the
collective security system function better would radically change the
purpose of that system under the U.N. Charter. Bertrand argues that the
Secretary-General's admission in An Agenda for Peace that the Security
Council may never have military resources at its disposal to deal with a
threat to or breach of the peace by a great power indicates that the
objective of a reformed collective security system "is to repress small

98. Although the membership of the Security Council has been increased from eleven to
fifteen members since 1945, no new permanent members have been added. Kirgis, supra note
80, at 506.
99. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council,
87 Am.J. INT'L L. 552, 573-74 (1993); Jordan J.Paust, Peace-Making and Security Council
Powers: Bosnia-Herzegovina Raises Internationaland ConstitutionalQuestions, 19 S.ILL. U.
L.J. 131, 135 (1994); W. Michael Reisman, The ConstitutionalCrisis in the United Nations,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 96 (1993); Smith, supra note 96, at 184.
100. See supra note 97.
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aggressors[.]" 0 Bertrand believes that this sort of collective security
system "would represent a complete change in the character of the
UN." 3 2 A fundamental aspect of liberal internationalism - the promise
of collective security against any threat to or breach of the peace - is
exposed as impossible by the Secretary-General's proposals for substantive reform of the Security Council. The only way to cover this gaping
hole in liberal internationalism is to assume, as does An Agenda for
Peace, that peace and consensus among the great powers in the Security
Council will henceforth prevail. 0 3 However, very little in the history of
international relations provides a foundation for such an assumption.
Hence, if that assumption is impossible to accept, then substantive
reform of the Security Council as envisaged by the Secretary-General
amounts only to a system of selective security that operates only when
the permanent members of the Security Council reach consensus.
Liberal internationalism also carries with it a problematic assumption reminiscent of the rationalism of traditional liberal thought: that all
states consider an effective role for the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security essential to international relations." 4 Such an assumption ignores the realities of international politics,
just as the progressive rationalism of traditional liberal thought overlooked the irrational element in international relations. An Agenda for
Peace reflects this assumption in its aspirational language on cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council:
Never again must the Security Council lose the collegiality
essential to its proper functioning, an attribute that it has
after such trial. A genuine sense of consensus deriving from
interests must govern its work, not the threat of the veto
power of any group of nations.""

that is
gained
shared
or the

Bertrand argues that the philosophy behind An Agenda for Peace - that
consensus not only exists among the great powers, but will continue to

101. Bertrand, supra note 97, at 432. The statements in An Agenda for Peace to which

Bertrand refers are as follows: "Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently
large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with
sophisticated weapons. They would be useful, however, in meeting any threat posed by a
military force of a lesser order." An Agenda for Peace, supra note 97, 9143.
102. Bertrand, supra note 97, at 432.
103. This assumption was, of course, present at the creation of the Security Council and
thus constitutes a permanent weakness in the United Nations' application of collective
security. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
104. See Abba Eban, The U.N. Idea Revisited, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 39, 46
(arguing that collective security will always remain a hollow doctrine because it is based on
invalid assumptions about international relations).
105. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 97, 1 78.
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exist and will be supported by other states - "seems to forget the lessons of history" and "is more apparent than real."'6 Further, the above-.
quoted language from An Agenda for Peace marks a shift away from the
influenced the creation
acceptance of power considerations that directly
07
and composition of the Security Council.
An Agenda for Peace turns its back on the realist elements of collective security to find refuge in the old liberal belief in the "harmony
of interests." The creation of the collective security systems in the
League of Nations and the United Nations reflected an understanding in
liberal thinking that the "harmony of interests" faith was unrealistic and
that international organization had to be empowered to deal with irrational and immoral states, including great powers. An Agenda for Peace
resurrects the limited "harmony of interests" faith applied to the great
powers at the creation of the Security Council: the permanent members
of the Security Council will act rationally and morally and will permit
the Security Council to deal effectively with lesser states that may still
engage in irrational and immoral activities. The resurrection of the
traditional "harmony of interests" rationalism indicates that liberal
internationalism has not advanced collective security beyond the ideas
present at the creation of the League of Nations and United Nations.
Liberal internationalism is, therefore, on the horns of a dilemma
resulting from its own principles. First, liberal internationalism can
welcome new permanent members into the Security Council based on its
power principle but will, in so doing, undermine the institutionalization
of power at the heart of liberal internationalism. Second, liberal
internationalism can (a) rely on the rational assumption that the need for
the Security Council is clear to all states without changing the
composition of the Security Council, and (b) focus on improving the
Security Council's performance in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and
humanitarian intervention. Following this policy, however, may
condemn the Security Council to reflecting the power structure of
another era and stifling cooperation to improve its efficacy. Third,
substantive reform proposals aimed at improving the Security Council's
performance reveal the weaknesses of the entire liberal internationalist
project because such reform proposals cannot fulfill the collective
security objective at the heart of liberal internationalism. As indicated by
An Agenda for Peace, the best that liberal internationalism can hope to
produce is a selective security system effective only against small states

106. Bertrand, supra note 97, at 435.
107. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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and held together by a retreat into the old, discredited liberal faith in the
"harmony of interests" of states.
B. Liberal Realism
The term "liberal realism" refers to the tradition of liberal thought
that holds that the balance of power as maintained by democratic states
is vital to the maintenance of international peace and security. As indicated in Part II, the belief in the necessity of maintaining a balance of
power became firmly entrenched in liberal thought only in the second
half of this century. Liberal realism accepts the realist critique of international organizations first developed by Rousseau: in international
relations, the imperative to obtain and maintain power for self-preservation compels a state to resist any effort to restrict or limit its ability to
provide for its own security. Thus, international organizations and
collective security systems constitute elaborate fagades of cooperation
that do nothing to limit effectively the sovereignty of states with regard
to international peace and security.'08 The failure of the collective security system in both the League of Nations and the United Nations provides liberal realism with ample historical evidence to support its position.
Reliance on the balance of power in liberal realism does not, however, mean that liberal realism abandons all tenets of traditional liberal
thought. The balance of power serves to provide security and order for
the democratic community of states and stability for the pursuit of
economic interdependence throughout the international system. The
ultimate objective is to make the position of democracy so secure that
its influence, coupled with the impact of economic interdependence, will
nurture the spread of democracy and capitalism in the international
system. As democratization occurs, the importance of the balance of
power diminishes, because ideological like-mindedness provides the

108. Michael Howard observes that
liberals laid the blame for war on the diplomats and their manipulation of the

balance of power. Again, clumsy diplomacy and ruthless power politics can cause
wars .... But it is the business of statesmen and diplomats to make it unnecessary
to fight such wars or to ensure that, if they do come, their country should not be
confronted by a coalition so overwhelming, and be left so bereft of help, that it
fights in a hopeless cause. To transcend this necessity and create a genuine world
system of collective security has been the aim of liberal statesmen throughout this
century. But such a system demands a degree of mutual confidence, a homogeneity
of values and a coincidence of perceived interests such as did not exist even in the

limited society of inter-war Europe. We are a long way from creating it in the
culturally heterogeneous world which we inhabit today.
HOWARD,

supra note 26, at 132.
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moderating restraint in the exercise of state power. The balance of
power withers away because democracies do not fight each other."°
The position of liberal realism toward the debates about the future
of the Security Council is clear: the debates are misguided because the
Security Council never has had nor ever will have the power to maintain
international peace and security. From a liberal realist's perspective, the
so-called reinvigoration of the Security Council since the end of the
Cold War does not support the tenets of liberal internationalism but
instead confirms the analyses of liberal realism. For instance, the Gulf
War was not a triumph for collective security but an initiative led by the
United States to restore the balance of power in the Persian Gulf.1 ° The
United States' willingness to use force against Iraq had little to do with
the "institutionalization of power" as envisioned by liberal internationalism but instead represented great power leadership in the international
system. The Security Council merely followed in the wake of the decisiveness of the United States."'
Moreover, the peacekeeping function is so far from the fundamental
purpose of the Security Council that to hold it out as evidence of success in the maintenance of international peace and security is misleading. Peacekeeping represents diplomacy by another means and constitutes passive use of military forces. At best, peacekeeping is a diplomatic tool that forms part of the "escape-route or ladder" constructed to
help states or domestic factions climb down from further confrontation.' 1 2 Because peacekeeping can serve the cause of diplomacy and the
peaceful settlement of disputes, liberal realism does not condemn or
necessarily oppose it; but it does not claim (as liberal internationalism
does) that peacekeeping represents an independent contribution of the
Security Council in dealing with threats to peace, breaches of peace, or

109. On the proposition that democracies do not fight each other, see Michael W. Doyle,
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and ForeignAffairs (pts. 1-2), 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 323 (1983).
But see Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and War, FOREIGN AFF.,

May-June 1995, at 79 (arguing that the process of democratization produces war and conflict).
110. Blechman, supra note.97, at 68.
111. Commentators have noted that UN involvement in post-Cold War crises is largely
determined by the attitude of the United States. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, Introduction
to ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 1, 6 (Lori F.
Damrosch ed., 1993); Max M. Kampelman, Forward to ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS, supra, at vii, xi-xii.
112. Anthony Parsons, The UN and the National Interests of States, in UNITED NATIONS,
DIVIDED WORLD, supra note 18, at 104, 105.
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acts of aggression." 3 Liberal realism looks skeptically at claims for an
activity that so often gets unanimous approval in the Security Council.
Perhaps such unanimity suggests how little peacekeeping actually touches on serious issues of international peace and security and the national
interests of the great powers.
Of all the United Nations' collective actions in the post-Cold War
period, involvement in the former Yugoslavia has had the best foundation
in the Security Council's mandate to maintain international peace and
security because the conflicts there have raised concerns that the fighting
might become truly international in scope. But, as James Steinberg
argues, the Security Council itself has been ambiguous about whether its
humanitarian actions in Bosnia can be justified under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter." 4 Steinberg concludes that "[a]lthough the
Council's decision to use UNPROFOR II in Bosnia to help deliver
humanitarian relief recited the talismanic 'threats to peace and security,'
the authorization of 'all measures necessary' was not directed to removing
or reducing those threats, but to the humanitarian goal .. .

113. Morphet notes that prior to 1987,
nearly all peacekeeping bodies set up by the Security Council had (implicitly) been
set up under Chapter VI of the Charter, which covers peaceful settlement of
disputes, and not under Chapter VII ....
Since 1987 a notable feature of Security Council practice has been the frequent use of Chapter VII in resolutions associated with peacekeeping ....
Morphet, supra note 88, at 231. What explains this change in Security Council practice?
Were the conflicts since 1987 in which United Nations peacekeepers got involved of such a
different character as to warrant reference to Chapter VII as opposed to Chapter VI? The
answers to these questions can be found not in the nature of these post-1987 conflicts, but in
what one commentator argues is "an even greater lack of discussion about the legal basis for
a particular Security Council resolution" in post-Cold War Security Council practice. N.D.
WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNA-

TIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 27 (1993). For an analysis of Security Council resolutions in
the post-Cold War period with respect to "threats to international peace and security," see
Kirgis, supra note 80, at 512-18 (discussing Security Council resolutions on Somalia, Haiti,
Angola, and Libyan terrorism and the lack of evidence or serious justifications that any of
these situations constituted a threat to international peace and security). Repeated reference to
"threats to peace and security" in Security Council resolutions does not mean that Security
Council actions under Chapter VII are really directed toward real threats to international
peace and security. Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that "continuing to stretch the concept
of threat to the peace ultimately undermines the legitimacy and authority of the entire UN
Charter. Once a threat to peace can mean anything from famine to the invasion of a sovereign
state, the concept is so broad as to be useless." Lori Fisler Damrosch, Concluding Reflections,
in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS, supra note

11, at 348, 356 (quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, EMERGING NORMS OF JUSTIFIED
INTERVENTION 111 (L.W. Reed & C. Kaysen eds., 1993)).
114. James B. Steinberg, InternationalInvolvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in ENFORCING
RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS, supra note 11, at 27, 54.
115. Id. at 55. Further, Steinberg indicates that the presence of United Nations troops in
Macedonia is not based on Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and is backed up ultimately by the
U.S. threat to use force against Serbia if Serbia brought the conflict to Kosovo. Id. at 54-55;
see also David Gompert, How to Defeat Serbia, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1994, at 40-42.
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Further, liberal realism critically views liberal internationalist claims
that the Security Council has developed and should strengthen its role in
peacemaking and humanitarian intervention. Most of its high-profile
efforts to make peace or intervene for humanitarian reasons have been
disasters for the United Nations. Somalia was a debacle as both the
peacemaking and humanitarian missions collapsed when the United States
decided that it had had enough." 16 Humanitarian intervention in Rwanda
occurred after the genocide had already transpired." 7 And the constant
humiliation of the United Nations effort in Bosnia by the Serbs" 8 and the
bitter controversies between the British, French, and Americans during the
crisis have cast a shadow over future United Nations-led humanitarian
intervention and peacekeeping efforts." 9
In addition, the failure of the collective security system means that
the role of the Security Council in maintaining internationalpeace and
security has become a responsibility to help maintain domestic peace and
security in countries torn apart by civil strife. An argument can be made
that domestic conflicts can have internationalconsequences, but that fact
is not new in international relations and never before has it served as a

rationale for an international organization's involvement in issues of
domestic peace and security. 20 The institutionalization of power at the

116. Blechman, supra note 97, at 68.
117. The massacres of Hutu opposition leaders, Tutsi leaders, and Tutsi civilians began
early in April 1994, but the Security Council did not approve humanitarian intervention until
May 17, 1994. Jason A. Dzubow, The International Response to the Civil War in Rwanda, 8
GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 513, 515-16 (1994).
118. With respect to Bosnia, Paust has written that "the Security Council has been worse
than ineffective in stopping human starvation used as an intentional strategy of war, intentional
shelling and bombing of civilians, mass rape, 'ethnic cleansing,' other genocidal acts, and
outside aggression." Paust, supra note 99, at 135.
119. As Kirgis argues in connection with the Security Council's involvement in civil
conflicts in the post-Cold War era, "[tihe results do not augur well for the future." Kirgis, supra
note 80, at 533.
120. The French Revolution sparked both historical precedent and theoretical ideas
concerning the international threat posed by civil unrest and revolution. The most well-known
historical precedent in this area is the attempt made by the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia,
Austria, and France) to implement through the Congress of Europe system set up after the
defeat of Napoleon collective intervention by the great powers against civil unrest and
disturbances in Europe. As Hinsley observed, the main purpose of the Congress of Europe
system "for all the continental states became the suppression of all and every disturbance in
Europe[.]" HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 202. The principle underneath the policy of the Holy
Alliance was that domestic unrest was directly an internationalconcern justifying great power
intervention to contain and eliminate the domestic agitation. Britain refused to support
collective intervention through the Congress of Europe system, and this difference between
Britain and the Holy Alliance on how to deal with domestic unrest became the issue on which
the Congress of Europe system foundered. See id. at 199-212. Edmund Burke provided a
theoretical foundation for intervention in the domestic affairs of another state in his efforts to
get Britain to take military action against revolutionary France. Burke argued that the close
proximity and shared historical heritage of European states gave states the right to intervene
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heart of liberal internationalism was intended to restrain sovereignty in
the international system not to attempt to bring order out of the chaos
precipitated by the collapse of states and civil societies. The raison d'etre
for the Security Council -- to limit the sovereignty of states with regard
to internationalpeace and security - no longer supports the role that the
Security Council plays. Liberal realism looks to the balance of power as
the real moderating restraint on state sovereignty.
The current debate over the expansion of the North American Treaty
Organization ("NATO") illustrates the relevance of liberal realism and
the irrelevance of liberal internationalism in the current international
system on the issue of providing international peace and security. The
newly independent states of Eastern Europe that once formed part of the
Soviet empire now look toward NATO and not the Security Council in
their pursuit of national security. The controversy engendered by the
NATO expansion debate reveals two important points that accrue in
favor of liberal realism. First, traditional concerns, anxieties, and fears
about national security still exist strongly in the international system.
These insecurities undermine liberal internationalism's claim that the
real international threats today come from domestic disintegration.
Second, those states seeking to join NATO want to tap. into a system of
collective defense based on an alliance and do not propose to rely for
national security on the United Nations' system of collective security.
Liberal realism sees in the NATO expansion debate clear signs that the
Security Council remains moribund in the area of maintaining international peace and security.
The problem of the disintegration of states and civil societies in the
contemporary international system has risen to the top of the "international security" agenda not because the Security Council has a mandate
to deal with these crises121 but because of the absence in the current
international system of a tension in the world-wide balance of power
similar to that which existed between the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. In that period, civil wars in the developing
world became flashpoints in the balance of power dynamic between the
two superpowers and thus were crises affecting internationalpeace and
security. On the other hand, civil wars and civil decay in the post-Cold
War period have not, with the possible exception of the former Yugoin the domestic affairs of neighboring states if unrest and revolution in such states threatened
the stability and order of Europe. See 9 EDMUND BURKE, First Letter on a Regicide Peace, in
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 187, 250-51 (R.B. McDowell ed., 1991).

121. Discussing Security Council peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions in
Somalia and Bosnia, Kirgis concludes that a "legal purist would have trouble finding authority in the Charter for Security Council measures of this sort[.]" Kirgis, supra note 80, at 535.
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slavia, been crises affecting international peace and security as traditionally understood. It is the nature of the current balance of power in the
international system that provides the Security Council with opportunities to become embroiled in ethnic cleansing, genocide, and civil disintegration. 22 Balance of power politics not only allow the Security Council
opportunities for humanitarian intervention and peacemaking but also
restrict the Security Council's abilities to act effectively in such situations. The lack of any real threat to international peace and security in
most of the civil conflicts in which the Security Council has intervened
has a double edge: while freeing the Security Council to act, the lack of
any real threat to national interests makes countries slow to act in response to civil implosion and quick to complain about the costs involved. 123 The absence of tension in the balance of power gives the
Security Council the opportunity to act too late, with too little, and too
expensively to be effective, in the missions it undertakes.
Finally, the intense controversy over expanding the permanent
membership of the Security Council, with its focus on properly reflecting power distribution in the contemporary international system, confirms the failure of the Security Council as a liberal internationalist
entity. For example, Germany and Japan do not want to become permanent members of the Security Council so that their governments can
plunge into the midst .of genocide or ethnic cleansing. Neither Germany
nor Japan has any intention of increasing its military role in strengthening collective security or in resolving domestic conflicts around the
world. 124 Further, German and Japanese economic power adds nothing

122. Rochester notes that the "UN's recent activism has a familiar cast to it, dependent
as it has been on past correlates of success, namely the relaxation of East-West tensions,
begging the question of whether those tensions will continue to subside and allow opportunities for organizational involvement in conflict situations." ROCHESTER, supra note 16, at 123;
see also Raymond F. Hopkins, Anomie, System Reform, and Challenges to the UN System, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS 72, 88-89 (Milton J. Esman &
Shibley Telhami eds., 1995).
123. Blechman observes,

All but a handful of member states refuse to commit their armed forces for
UN peacekeeping duty prior to the authorization of a specific mission by the
Security Council. As a result, it continues to take months to create the forces
required for each operation....
. . "The United Nations is now being asked to carry out many more peacekeeping missions, and those missions are typically much more difficult than before,
but the problems of financing those operations are only getting worse as member
states balk at paying the higher costs generated by the new responsibilities they
have placed on the world body.

Blechman, supra note 97, at 69, 75-76.
124. Reisman argues that "the admission of Germany and Japan to permanent member-

ship ...will have no significance for the effectiveness of the Security Council operating
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that would improve the functioning of the collective security system. 25
In fact, expanding the permanent membership of the Security Council
makes it less likely (if that is possible) that the collective security system will ever function according to liberal internationalism because
more vetoes will exist. United States support for German and Japanese

permanent seats126 can be interpreted as an admission that for all intents
and purposes the collective security system is defunct. What is really
occurring in the movement to make Germany and Japan permanent
members is, in the eyes of a liberal realist, an attempt to replicate, in
somewhat more formal attire, a concert of great powers reminiscent of
the nineteenth century Concert of Europe. 127 Thus, the enlargement
controversy is about reflecting the contemporary power distribution in
the Security Council and perhaps utilizing the Security Council 28
for
balance of power purposes following the Concert of Europe model.
Arguments made by developing countries, like India, 29 that one or
more developing states should be given permanent seats on the Security
Council also reflect balance of power considerations. One of the fears

under chapter VII . . . because currently neither Germany nor Japan is able, under internal
constitutional dispensations, to participate in any meaningful fashion in chapter VII operations." W. Michael Reisman, Amending the UN Charter: The Art of the Feasible, 88 PROc.
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 108, 110 (1994).
125. Id.
126. Smith, supra note 96, at 185.
127. Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective
Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201, 257 (1994). Michael Howard
observes that the Security Council has inherited the containment of domestic conflicts not
from the League of Nations but from the "Concert of Powers which kept order in Europe
before 1914[.]" Howard, supra note 89, at 77. The behavior of the Security Council in the
post-Cold War period suggests that the Concert of Europe model is not far-fetched. White has
observed that
Security Council debates are no longer characterised by lengthy Cold War rhetoric
by numerous invited non-members as well as the members; instead there are short
meetings to approve formally resolutions previously negotiated and agreed upon
informally behind closed doors.... It has become extremely difficult to gauge the
political and legal movements in the Security Council, although it is true to say that
the organ is now Western dominated.
WHITE, supra note 113, at 27-28. See also Kirgis, supra note 80, at 518-19.
128. The Concert of Europe developed after the failure of the Congress of Europe
system in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Congress of Europe system represented
an attempt by the five great European powers - Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia
- to cooperate systematically and regularly through diplomatic congresses or formal meetings to preserve peace in Europe. See HINSLEY, supra note 27, at 193-96. When the Congress
of Europe system broke down, a "looser association of the Great Powers continued in
existence ... limited to dealing with problems as they arose, not seeking to anticipate them
or to iron them out of existence." Id. at 213. Although a formal institution with regular
meetings (suggesting an affinity with the Congress of Europe system), a Security Council
with an expanded permanent membership could act as a modern day concert of great powers
dealing with problems as they arise.
129. Smith, supra note 96, at 185.
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about the recent vigor of the Security Council is that Western powers
dominate its policies and actions. 30 Developing countries may fear that
the Security Council could become the instrument of the United States
and its allies and utilized for their narrow interests. Such a prospect
undermines the legitimacy of the Security Council by sanctioning the
use of power by an international organization that does not reflect the
interests of the majority of states.' The Security Council could then
become yet another example of the imbalance of power in international
relations between the developed and developing world.
C. Liberal Globalism
The term "liberal globalism" refers to the tradition of liberal thought
that holds that economic interdependence between states and peoples is
the key to providing peace and security in the international system. The
importance of free trade and economic interdependence in liberal
thought was one of the prominent themes of the overview provided in
Part II. Robert Gilpin summarizes this tenet of liberal thinking:
In essence, liberals believe that trade and economic intercourse
are a source of peaceful relations among nations because the mutual benefits of trade and expanding interdependence among national
economies will tend to foster cooperative relations .... A liberal

international economy will have a moderating influence on international politics as it creates bonds of mutual interests and a commitment to the status quo. 132
As noted in Part II, the belief in economic interdependence was
more firmly established in liberal thought than either the concept of the
balance of power or the use of international organizations to maintain
international peace and security. In fact, the successive movements in
liberal thought toward international organizations and then the balance
of power represent a manifest lessening of the strength of the faith in
interdependence in liberal thought. 33 The faith in economic interdepen-

130. Caron, supra note 99, at 562.
131. Id. at 563. The U.N. Charter states that one of the organization's ends is "to ensure
...that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest[.]" U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
132. GILPIN, supra note 85, at 31.
133. As Hoffmann and Fidler point out,
[t]he First World War, which showed that the force of transnational links established by private interests was far inferior to the passions of interstate rivalries,
dealt a cruel blow to the optimistic view of the beneficent effects of commerce put
forward by Montesquieu, the philosophes, Kant, and the liberals of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.
Hoffmann & Fidler, supra note 4, at lxxv.
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dence has, however, been reinvigorated in recent years through the
combination of three developments: (1) the triumph of liberal philosophy in international relations after the end of the Cold War, (2) the
palpable success of the economic integration occurring in the European
Union, and (3) the recognition of the impact of the process of globalization.
The victory of liberalism over communism has sparked a renewal of
energy for liberal globalism because (1) the philosophy of free markets
and free trade has emerged unchallenged as the dominant model of
economic life, and (2) the collapse of the ideological conflict has lessened the military and strategic confrontation between great powers that
provided the fuel for liberal realism. Economic interdependence is no
longer subordinated to military and strategic concerns. A living example
of the fruits of economic interdependence can be found in the European
Union. The whole strategy of the European Union was to rely on economic interdependence for creating peace in Europe and to reject the
collective security approach of the League of Nations and United Nations. The economic interdependence model is now one of the hottest
ideas in international relations, as embodied in regional trade agreements
and free-trade areas. As The Economist has observed, "[r]arely has free
trade seemed so fashionable."' 34
Finally, the process of globalization has been identified as one of
the most important developments in international relations. "Globalization" has been defined as "the process of denationalization of markets,
laws and politics in the sense of interlacing peoples and individuals for
the sake of the common good."'35 Although some literature describes
globalization as a new phenomenon, it actually combines the old liberal
belief in economic interdependence with new technological developments that have intensified the pace of economic interdependence.' 36
Globalization shares with the liberal faith in economic interdependence
the goal of eroding state sovereignty to build connections and interests
between peoples of the world. The process of globalization can be seen

134. Regionalism and Trade: The Right Direction?,ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 1995, at 23.
135. Jost Delbrilck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets: Implications for
Domestic Law: A European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993). Note

the similarity between Delbrtilck's definition of globalization and Richard Cobden's belief that
peace between nations would be assured with "as little connection as possible between
governments and as much connection as possible between the nations of the world." HINSLEY,
supra note 27, at 97. Richard Cobden was the leading British advocate of "peace through free

trade" in the nineteenth century. ANGLO-AMERICAN

TRADITION,

supra note 54, at 194-95.

136. Delbrilck, supra note 135, at 17; David Held, Democracy, the Nation-State and the
Global System, in POLITICAL THEORY TODAY 197, 206 (David Held ed., 1991).
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as breathing new life into the liberal emphasis on economic interdependence as the path to international peace and security.
Liberal globalism places economic interdependence back in its historically leading position within liberal thought in relation to maintaining international peace and security. The liberal globalist outlook on the
debate over the future of the Security Council differs radically from
liberal internationalism and liberal realism because liberal globalism
does not emphasize international organization or the balance of power as
means to maintain international peace and security. The liberal globalist
perspective is that collective security is, at best, subordinate to the
dynamic forces of globalization' 37 and, at worst, irrelevant to providing
the bonds between nations upon which peace ultimately rests. Liberal
globalism partakes of the attitude expressed by Edmund Burke in his
First Letter on a Regicide Peace:
In the intercourse between nations, we are apt to rely too much on
the instrumental part .... Men are not tied to one another by paper
and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing
is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have
more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations
138
written in the heart.
Collective security, peacekeeping, and the other variants of Security
Council action are "instrumental" devices, mere "paper and seals"
signed and manipulated by governments. Globalization, on the other
hand, produces a correspondence in economic laws, customs, manners,
and habits that binds different peoples together. Liberal globalism posits
that the ultimate guarantee of international peace and security can be

137. Richard Falk has argued that the process of globalization alters the Security Council
by allowing its permanent members to use it to serve "mainly those interests perceived as
globalized: That is, it pushes forward the agenda of economic consolidation by protecting
strategic resources and inhibits challenges to the established order by so-called backlash states
(such as Iran, North Korea, Libya and Iraq)." Richard Falk, Appraising the U.N. at 50: The
Looming Challenge, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 625, 637-38 (1995).
138. BURKE, supra note 120, at 247. This reference to Burke does not imply that Burke
was a liberal globalist. Burke did, however, subscribe to the belief that free trade could foster
common interests between peoples. See 9 EDMUND BURKE, Two Letters on the Trade of
Ireland, in WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE, supra note 120, at 506, 509-10

(Burke defends his vote in favor of liberalizing trade between Britain and Ireland because
"England and Ireland may flourish together. The world is large enough for us both.").
Wolfers and Martin include Burke in the Anglo-American tradition in foreign affairs. See
ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION, supra note 54, at 109-25.
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found in the like-mindedness of private citizens and not in the agreements of governments. From the perspective of liberal globalism, reform
efforts at the United Nations would be better directed at facilitating the
process of globalization by revamping the United Nations' programs on
trade and economic development. The perspective of liberal globalism
on Security Council and United Nations reform is supported by the fact
that seventy-five percent of the United Nations' resources
are spent in
39
activities in the economic, social, and technical areas.
The applications of Germany and Japan for permanent seats on the
Security Council can be interpreted, ironically, as a vindication of the
liberal globalist position on maintaining international peace and security
because Germany and Japan can make such applications based on their
economic position in international relations. Germany and Japan have
achieved their status by being thoroughly integrated into the process of
economic interdependence and globalization. The stability, wealth, and
pacific nature of Germany and Japan underscores the peace-creating
potential of economic interdependence. Adding Germany and Japan to
the Security Council's permanent membership will merely reflect that
the future international order will be dominated by economic forces far
beyond the control of the Security Council or the United Nations. Under
the liberal globalist perspective, the liberal internationalist fixation on
the Security Council, and the controversy surrounding its reform, belong
to another age and time that events have abandoned. Liberal globalism
sees the future of international peace and security through the process of
globalization and wants to leave the Security Council for those interested in diplomatic fossils." 4
D. Summary of the Divisions in the Liberal Tradition:
Any Common Ground?
The descriptions of the three competing liberal perspectives on the
maintenance of international peace and security indicate that these

139. ROCHESTER, supra note 16, at 129.
140. It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt a systematic critical analysis of
liberal internationalism, liberal realism, and liberal globalism. Although liberal internationalism receives the greatest scrutiny here because it is most directly linked with the Security
Council, problems exist with liberal realism and liberal globalism as traditions of liberal
thought on international relations. For example, there are questions over whether liberal
realism resonates with democratic politics absent the menace of an "evil empire." The
presentation of the containment strategy by American presidents to the American people as a
necessity in the confrontation between good and evil is a consistent theme of Cold War
politics. No such dramatic justification for balance of power politics now exists. Liberal
globalism has to confront the observation that the process of globalization may be undermining democracy. On this point, see BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 6 (1995);
Benjamin R. Barber, Global Democracy or Global Law: Which Comes First?, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119, 121 (1993); Held, supra note 136, at 222-27.
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perspectives are far apart in their outlook on and prescriptions for international relations. Liberal internationalism focuses on international
organization, liberal realism on the balance of power, and liberal globalism on economic interdependence. The very different emphases of the
three liberal perspectives suggests that no common ground exists between them in connection with the task of maintaining international
peace and security. If this is indeed the case, the question arises whether
there really is such a thing as the "liberal tradition" with respect to
maintaining international peace and security.
Common ground does, however, exist; but the common ground exists
in the values and goals underlying the different perspectives. All three
liberal perspectives share the fundamental aims of liberal political philosophy: individual liberty, democratic governance, and international peace.
All three perspectives also share the liberal belief that all three fundamental objectives of liberal thought interrelate tightly so that threats to
international peace and security also constitute threats to individual
liberties and democracy. The differences begin when means and methods
have to be chosen to pursue the fundamental goals of the liberal tradition.
It is important to point out that while the primary emphases of each
of the liberal perspectives on maintaining international peace and security
differ significantly, none of the perspectives entirely rejects the means of
the others. Some overlap, then, does exist between the traditions in terms
of the means necessary to maintain international peace and security. Figure
1.1 ranks the relative importance of economic interdependence, international organization, and the balance of power for each of liberal internationalism, liberal realism, and liberal globalism.
FIGURE 1.1
Liberal
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Internationalism
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Economic
Interdependence

2

2

1

International
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1
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2
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3

1
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For liberal internationalism, international organization is most
important in maintaining international peace and security. Liberal
internationalism considers economic interdependence a secondary means
of maintaining international peace and security because it ascribes to the
liberal belief the ameliorating effects of trade. International organization
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can help facilitate economic interdependence by promoting peaceful
economic intercourse between states and by working to eliminate obstacles to freer trade and investment. Economic interdependence is secondary, however, because liberal internationalism does not accord economic
interdependence the potential given to it in traditional liberal thought
prior to the First World War or in liberal globalism. Even the balance of
power cannot be entirely rejected under liberal internationalism because
history has shown that liberal states need the balance of power as a
mechanism for providing some systemic order in international relations
if collective security cannot work properly because of great power
rivalries. For liberal internationalism, the balance of power is a means of
last resort filled with uncertainties and the potential for more conflict
and war.
As analyzed earlier, liberal realism sees the balance of power as the
only realistic way to maintain international peace and security. The
balance of power is not, as it is for liberal internationalism, a stop-gap
measure to be used only in crisis situations. It is instead a permanent
feature of international relations. The balance of power acts, however, as
a facilitator for democratic states to pursue with some degree of confidence international trade and investment, which makes the balance of
power a foundation for economic interdependence and for the beneficial
impact it can have on interstate relations. Liberal realism also does not
write off international organization completely because international
organization can be useful in balance of power politics and in facilitating economic interdependence.
Economic interdependence stands atop liberal globalism's list of
priorities for reasons analyzed earlier. International organization is
secondary in importance only to the extent that it helps the process of
economic interdependence. International organization is less useful if it
expends time and energy attempting to maintain international peace and
security itself. The balance of power barely registers with liberal globalism, which is more dismissive of the balance of power than liberal
internationalism. For liberal globalism, the balance of power may have
temporary utility in isolated cases of belligerent states that are unresponsive to the logic of economic interdependence but not as a systemic
principle for maintaining international peace and security.
Although some common ground can be found on means among
liberal internationalism, liberal realism, and liberal globalism, particularly with respect to economic interdependence, the primary means emphasized by each perspective remain dramatically different and in many
respects antithetical. These different primary means suggest that the
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liberal perspectives disagree not only about the best way to provide for
and maintain international peace and security but also about the basic
dynamics of international relations. Like the various social contract
theorists differing over whether the state of nature was a state of war or
a state of peace, 4 ' the liberal perspectives on international relations
draw contrasting pictures of international relations. Placed on a crude
spectrum, liberal realism, with its emphasis on the primacy of the state
and power and its exercise, and liberal globalism, with its emphasis on
substate actors and the rationality of economic behavior, make up the
two extreme positions. In between sits liberal internationalism because it
recognizes the importance of power in international relations while
advocating a cooperative, coordinated approach to issues of peace and
war.
To illustrate the differences between the three liberal perspectives by
reference to more traditional categories of international relations theory,
liberal internationalism, liberal realism, and liberal globalism can be
interpreted as examples of rationalism, realism, and revolutionism respectively.142 According to Wight, "[r]ationalists are those who concentrate on, and believe in the value of, the element of international intercourse in a condition predominantly of international anarchy.' 4 3 Each of
the liberal perspectives contains elements of rationalism because none
eschews international intercourse; but liberal internationalism, more than
the other two perspectives, expresses rationalism's belief in reason and
its operation in the relations among states.' 44 Liberal internationalism
contains the sentiments of rationalism that "[t]he inherent social cooperativeness of men, which has banished war from municipal society,
may restrain war in international society."'' 45 As Wight observes, "[t]he
Rationalist tradition is the broad middle road of European thinking[;]' ' 146
and liberal internationalism likewise constitutes the middle path of
liberal thinking on international relations. Further, the ideas of collective
security and international organization belong squarely in the tradition of

141. Thomas Hobbes characterized the state of nature as a state of war, "of every man,
against every man." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 185 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1968) (1651). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, on the other hand, conceived of the state of nature as
pacific. MAURICE CRANSTON, JEAN-JACQUES: THE EARLY LIFE AND WORK OF JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU 1712-1754, at 294 (1983).
. 142. Rationalism, realism, and revolutionism are theoretical categories developed
by
Martin Wight. See WIGHT, supra note 10, at 7-24.
143. Id. at 13.
144. Id. at 13-14.
145. Id. at 207.
146. Id. at 14.
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rationalism. Wight notes that under rationalism's concepts "it is possible
to make broad statements of a common international interest .... especially through the
constitutional machinery and organizations of interna' 47
tional society."'
Liberal realism is not purely realism as mentioned earlier. 48 However, within Wight's three traditions, liberal realism fits more closely
within realism than rationalism or revolutionism because it emphasizes
the primacy of the state, power politics, and behaving according to "the
actual, what is, rather than the ideal, or what ought to be[.]''149
Liberal
realism's emphasis on the balance of power mirrors realism's "symbol
of international politics[:] ... a balance or pair of scales."'" Like realism, liberal realism regards notions of collective security or world
security as misguided because "[s]ecurity ...is a function of power...
[and] is a relational concept: security against whom?"''
Liberal globalism's embrace of cosmopolitan capitalism and its
championing of the creation of interdependence between individuals and
peoples through economic intercourse captures the essence of
revolutionism, which Wight defined as the tradition of thought that
stresses "the moral unity of the society of states."'5 2 Liberal globalism
asserts, like revolutionism, "that the interest of the civitas maxima, the
society of states and fraternity of mankind, is both definable and attainable." 53 In fact, Wight observes that "the doctrine of laissez-faire, which
was the guiding philosophy of Britain during her Victorian predominance, was as authentically Revolutionist a doctrine as Jacobinism for
' 54
Revolutionary France."'
Identifying liberal internationalism, liberal realism, and liberal
globalism within Wight's three separate traditions of international relations theory raises the question whether it is possible to synthesize them
in order to create a more unified liberal tradition. Perhaps the only
option available is to embrace one of the three competing perspectives
and defend that choice to the best of one's abilities with the understanding that total agreement will never be achieved. Complicating the dishar-

147. Id. at 128.
148. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
149. WIGHT, supra note 10, at 17.
150. Id. at 18.
151. Id. at 114.
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 114.
154. Id. at 114-15. Wight notes that laissez-faire's "supreme theoretical exponent was
Cobden." Id. The similarity between liberal globalism and Cobden's "peace through free
trade" belief was mentioned earlier. See supra note 135.
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mony in liberal thought further are the changing circumstances of international relations, which cause one perspective to dominate the others
during a particular period only to fall out of favor when international
politics change. Collective security supplanted economic interdependence in liberal thought after the First World War. Then, the balance of
power replaced collective security after the Second World War. After
the end of the Cold War, collective security and economic interdependence have experienced a new prominence at the expense of balance of
power thinking. Perhaps the only synthesis of the three liberal perspectives is to allow liberals the freedom to shift among them depending on
the existing international situation. This approach might avoid forcing
liberals into contrived philosophical pigeon-holes and keep open the
broadest array of options.
Such a "buffet" synthesis underestimates, however, the fundamental
differences among liberal internationalism, liberal realism, and liberal
globalism. Keeping open all options is also a device to avoid confronting the choice about what basic assumptions will determine one's outlook on international relations. As illustrated by the application of
Wight's three traditions, the three liberal perspectives are miles apart on
their images of what international relations are and should be. The
"buffet" synthesis risks allowing policy decisions to be made without a
foundation, a central core supporting the entire endeavor with a consistent (if not necessarily correct) logic. Such an approach to the disharmony in liberal thought on international relations is a recipe for more, not
less, confusion in liberal thinking.
CONCLUSION

Reforming, restructuring, and rejuvenating the Security Council for
the next fifty years will prove difficult not only because of diplomatic
obstacles but also because of the lack of consensus in liberal thought
about the purpose and potential of the Security Council. As a creation of
liberal thinking, the Security Council ultimately succeeds or fails on the
consensus that can be generated in liberal thought on the propriety of
relying on an international organization to maintain international peace
and security. Presently and in the past, the consensus has been shallow.
Liberals from all traditions can find some common ground in having the
Security Council involved in peacekeeping or humanitarian projects.
Nevertheless, the tension within liberal thought on the role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security
creates an obstacle to the fulfillment of that role even before the frictions of diplomacy come into play.
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The philosophical conundrum limiting the role of the Security
Council reflects the age-old struggle with liberal thought's fundamental
dilemma in international relations. Domestically, liberal political thought
includes a properly-constructed state as part of its answer to ensuring
individual freedom. The need for the state domestically creates, however, the problem of international relations. A democratic state recognizes
the people as the sovereign, and thus the state cannot recognize any
superior authority and simultaneously remain true to liberal political
principles. The existence of separate states recognizing no higher power
creates an international system filled with the potential for insecurity,
conflict, and violence. 55 Liberal thought had to find a way to preserve
the sovereign state while dealing with the dangers of international
politics.
The three strands of liberal thought examined in this article all
represent different attempts to come to grips with the fundamental
dilemma of liberal thought on international relations. Hopkins argues
that "[Il]iberal principles have gained ascendancy but fail to construct
sufficient authority for their maintenance."'' 56 Liberal internationalism,
liberal realism, and liberal globalism contain different propositions on
how best to construct a liberal world order. As Stanley Hoffmann has
noted, "liberals have been notoriously divided over the best way to cope
with the 'real world' of international relations.' 57 While the diversity of
views present in liberal thought on international relations could be seen
as evidence of creativity and adaptability, such diversity could just as
easily be evidence of the beating liberal thought has taken in international affairs - what Hoffmann calls "the rather colossal fiasco of
liberalism in world affairs[.]"'' S Dredging up liberal thought's painful
past and internal tensions at a moment when liberalism supposedly
stands victorious, on the edge of the "end of history," is certainly not
avant-garde. But the debate over the future of the Security Council
should include an understanding that the philosophical foundation in
liberal thought for this institution has been and will remain precarious.
Further, an understanding of the division in liberal thought on the role
of the Security Council indicates that its potential will remain perma-

155. Waltz, supra note 52, at 334.
156. Hopkins, supra note 122, at 95-96.
157. HOFFMANN, supra note 7, at 399.
158. Id. at 395. Michael Howard has called the history of liberal thought on-international
relations "this melancholy story of the efforts of good men to abolish war but only succeeding
thereby in making it more terrible[.]" HOWARD, supra note 26, at 130.
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nently limited because it will always be in this liberal philosophical
conundrum, caught between the competing traditions of liberal thought
on international relations.

